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This paper analyses monetary policy transparency of the central bank 
(SBP) using the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index. The results show that the 
SBP scores 4.5 out of 15, which is lower than any of the central banks’ score in 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). The SBP is completely opaque on the procedural 
issues, whereas it is the least transparent in the policy transparency. On the 
political and the economic matters, the SBP is partially transparent. An area 
where the SBP is quite transparent, with moderate score, is operational 
transparency. In comparison with the other central banks, the SBP is at par with 
some of the central banks in political and operational transparency but ranks 
behind in all other respects.  
 
JEL classification:  E52, E58 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy Transparency, State Bank of Pakistan, 






1.  INTRODUCTION 
The insightful contribution of time inconsistency problem, advanced by 
Kydland and Prescott in 1977, has greatly influenced both the theory and 
practice of monetary policy. Monetary theorists have proposed four broad 
solutions to the time inconsistency problem including central bank 
independence, delegation of powers to conservative central bankers, simple 
rules and central bankers’ contracts.
1 Another strand of literature has focused on 
monetary policy transparency both as a potential solution to the time 
inconsistency problem and as a complement to central bank independence.
2 
Enhanced monetary policy transparency can yield additional dividends 
including, for example, less fiscal pressures on monetary authorities, promoting 
debate on monetary policy issues that may compel central banks to achieve 
efficiency in terms of policy design for socially optimal targets, improved 
private sector learning about monetary policy, and better accountability of 
independent central banks.  
Despite the importance of monetary policy transparency in 
macroeconomic management, no effort has been made to analyse this issue in 
Pakistan. This paper is a step in that direction. Section 2 discusses the concept of 
monetary policy transparency in the light of available literature, whereas Section 
3 sets out the methodology for the measurement of transparency. Section 4 
presents the results pertaining to the level of transparency of the State Bank of 
Pakistan on different monetary policy issues, and highlights the importance of 
different types of transparency and practices in Pakistan in the light of the 
literature. Section 5 compares transparency of the SBP with the central banks 
studied in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). Section 6 concludes the discussion.  
 
2.  MONETARY POLICY TRANSPARENCY 
Monetary policy transparency involves the disclosure of information by the 
central bank relevant to the conduct of monetary policy and requires symmetric 
information between the central bank and the private economic agents [Geraats 
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1See, for instance, Cukierman (1992); Rogoff (1985), and Walsh (1995), among others. 
2See, for instance, Geraats (2002a); Mishkin (2004).  
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(2002a, 2005a)]. A transparent central bank can not have superior information about 
the state of the economy, transmission mechanism, economic data, and institutional 
arrangements etc. It is important to note that transparency does not require perfect 
knowledge of the economy as both the central bank and the general public may have 
imperfect information regarding shocks to the economy.
3 Complete transparency 
requires openness on every aspect of the policy making process from 
objectives/ultimate goals of monetary policy
4 to quantitative targets, relative weights 
on each of the objectives and the functional form of the objective function, and from 
setting policy instrument to achieving ultimate goals.  
A transparent monetary policy entails several benefits.
5 To begin with, 
transparency lies at the heart of central bank independence and accountability. 
Mishkin (2004) and Nijathaworn (2006) argue that transparency increases public 
support for central bank policies which is essential for winning central bank 
independence.
6 The increased independence requires accountability of the 
central bankers to the society, as it is necessary for the legitimacy of the 
monetary policy, [Goodhart, Hildebrand, Lipton, and Wyplosz (2001); Mishkin 
(2004); Briault, Haldane, and King (1997); Buiter (1999); and Geraats (2002b)]. 
However, accountability of the central bankers cannot be achieved if the public 
is not fully informed of the monetary policy-making process. In this way, 
transparency can be thought of as a complement to central bank accountability 
[Geraats (2002a)]. Second, transparency not only helps improve the efficiency 
of the central bank but also makes it costly for the central bank to deviate from 
society’s preferences
7 [Buiter (1999); Bernanke, et al. (1999); Blinder, et al. 
(2001); and Roll, et al. (1993)]. Third, increased transparency can help reduce 
uncertainty in financial markets thereby improving long-run growth prospects 
[Nijathaworn (2006); Poole, et al. (2002); Svensson (2003)]. Fourth, a high 
degree of transparency forces the central bank to adhere to the stated objective 
and targets, thus increasing the credibility of the central bank [Faust and 
Svensson (2001); Levin, et al. (2004)].  
                                                 
3Another view of transparency emphasises common understanding of the monetary policy 
by all the actors including the public [Winkler (2002)].  
4While several objectives of monetary policy are highlighted in the literature, the two most 
important are output and price stability [Mishkin (2001)]. 
5It bears emphasis that any benefit from the point of view of society may be a loss to the 
central banker and vice versa. So costs and benefits of transparency should be carefully analysed 
from the point of view of both the society and the central bank. Society includes general public, 
government officials as agents of the public and financial market players.  
6Mishkin and Posen (1997) and Bernanke, et al. (1999) argue that increased transparency in 
the form of pre-announced inflation targets helped both Bank of Canada and Bank of England to 
gain public support and independence. 
7The transparency could create problem if there is desirability of surprise inflation to 
enhance output in the short run. However, the advantage of opacity can only be achieved if the 
central bank has superior information about the shocks and the economy has Lucas-type 
transmission mechanism, [Gersbach (1998); Cukierman (2001, 2002)].   
 
3 
Monetary policy transparency holds particular significance for developing 
countries where misperceptions and lack of knowledge about monetary policy 
issues and outcomes are not uncommon. In this context, an important benefit of 
transparency is that it can educate the public about what monetary policy can 
and can not do and thus avoid unnecessary criticism on the central bankers 
[Svensson (2002)]. Another benefit of transparency for developing countries is 
the promotion of public dialogue on policy issues that can be instrumental in 
bringing central bank policies in line with society’s preferences.
8 Also, a 
transparent monetary policy is vital for enforcing fiscal discipline on 
governments that rely heavily on seignorage revenues to meet budgetary 
shortfalls.
9 Finally, monetary policy transparency can allow the public to 
compare central bank performance with international best practices, and thus 
create public pressure for the adoption of such practices whenever the 
performance of the central bank falls short of internationally accepted 
benchmarks.
10   
  
3.  METHODOLOGY 
We employ the Eijffinger and Geraat (2006) ‘independent analysis’ 
approach
11 to measure monetary policy transparency of the State Bank of 
Pakistan. According to this approach, a questionnaire (see Appendix A) is 
developed on monetary policy issues and the researcher independently answers 
the questions based on information gleaned from various central bank 
documents like reports on the state of the economy, monetary policy statements, 
and speeches of the central bank officials.
12 The questionnaire elicits 
information through a set of fifteen questions, with three questions each on 
political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency. Each 
question has two or three options with a maximum score of 1. In case of two 
options the central bank is awarded either 0 or 1 score but in case of three 
options there is a middle score of 0.5 (a case of partial transparency). In 
aggregating the score, all the questions are given equal weight so on each aspect 
                                                 
8This is especially important because of the fact that policy issues are rarely resolved in 
public debates in developing countries. So more often policies are not in accord with society’s 
preferences. 
9For instance in Pakistan, most of the times monetary aggregate target has been missed due 
to high monetisation of fiscal deficit. 
10For instance, SBP does not publish medium term forecast for inflation and output. It is 
most probable that it does not make forecasts for medium term. So transparency requirement by 
public would induce SBP to make such forecasts that would be helpful both for public (in reducing 
uncertainty) and for SBP. 
11Other studies have developed survey-based methods to measuring transparency. See, for 
example, Fracasso, et al. (2003), and Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001).  
12An important benefit of independent analysis is that the researcher keeps in mind the 
objectives of transparency, while analysing the case of a particular central bank.  
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of transparency a central bank can get a maximum score of 3. Each type of 
transparency is also given the same weight so there is no preference for one type 
of transparency over the other
13. In this way a central bank can get a maximum 
score of 15. 
There are at least three important advantages of using the Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006) index. First, unlike survey-based techniques, this index is based 
on an independent analysis (by the researcher) of monetary policy practices.
14 
This is important because in surveys, respondents (central bankers) may have an 
incentive to falsely portray a favourable scenario of monetary policy 
transparency. Second, the index covers almost all the aspects of monetary policy 
and hence presents a broader measure of transparency as compared with other 
works that have focused on only two or three aspects. Third, the index is not 
restricted to any particular type of monetary policy framework e.g. inflation 
targeting, monetary targeting etc. 
 
4.  HOW TRANSPARENT IS THE SBP? 
 
4.1. Political Transparency 
According to Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), political transparency refers 
to the openness about monetary policy objectives, quantification of these 
objectives and institutional setting for interaction between government and the 
central bank.  
 
(a)  Formal Objectives 
Pakistan is a developing country having multiple objectives of 
monetary policy. SBP has the dual mandate of maintaining price stability 
and promoting output growth along with other objectives like foreign 
exchange rate stability. There has been no clear prioritisation of the 
objectives with shifting preferences between price stability and output 
growth. Monetary policy has been kept expansionary whenever inflation was 
under control and/or government was unable to provide fiscal stimulus. This 
was exactly the strategy in 2000-01. But as inflation reached a sufficiently 
high level, the SBP tried to contain it (like the contractionary actions taken 
in 2005 and are still in force). This behaviour is clear from the statements 
given in SBP’s “monetary policy statements”.
15 
                                                 
13This is one of the drawbacks of the measure as practically some aspects of transparency 
might be more important than the others. 
14The assessment by professionals, who have the knowledge on the issue, is necessary 
because what matters is information fulfilling the objectives of transparency and not just the release 
of information without quality and detailed contents of information reports.  
15See, SBP’s Monetary Policy Statement for Jul-Dec 2006 on the topic, “Recent Trends and 
FY06 Policy Assessment” points 8-10.  
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Though the SBP clearly states its objectives, it does not provide an 
explicit statement on their prioritisation. One may argue that prioritisation is 
mentioned whenever required in monetary policy reports by the SBP and 
hence it is transparent in this regard. But we should keep in mind the 
objective of transparency i.e. less uncertainty about central bank’s actions. 
To reduce uncertainty about central bank actions it is necessary to have 
knowledge on central bank’s long-term objectives and their prioritisation in 
case of multiple objectives. Though SBP’s documents often spell out the 
intentions and preferences of the bank for the near future (mostly for one 
year), these may change depending on the state of the economy. Also, the 
ex-post statements by the central bank are merely policy explanations that 
can not be taken as furthering the objective of transparency. Therefore, one 
can say that the SBP is transparent on announcing the objectives but not on 
the issue of prioritising the multiple and conflicting objectives. 




(b)  Quantification of the Targets 
The announcement of targets reduces uncertainty faced by the 
economic agents in making economic decisions. The SBP announces one-
year inflation and output targets but provides no information on medium-
term targets.
16 However, the announcement of one-year targets is of little 
value to economic agents who make decisions on the basis of expectations 
about medium or the long run. Furthermore, as Geraats (2005a) points out, 
the short-term targets are just forecasts/projections rather than the targets in 
the conventional sense, as the lag with which monetary policy actions affect 
the outcome (inflation) is normally greater than one year.
17 We, therefore, 
conclude that the objective of transparency (reducing uncertainty) is not 
achieved by announcing just the short-term targets, and hence the monetary 
policy in Pakistan is still deficient in this area justifying a zero score on this 
count
18 (Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
16It is worth noting that these targets (of inflation and output) are set by the government, and 
hence the SBP does not have goal independence. 
17In the case of Pakistan, Malik (2006) shows that the impact of changes in reserve money 
on inflation appears with a time lag from one to one and half year. 
18There are only two options in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) questionnaire. Had there been 
a third option for giving half score to the central banks providing information on short-term targets, 
SBP would have been awarded half score.   
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Fig. 1.  Political Transparency in Pakistan 

























(c)  Institutional Arrangement 
The process of independence of SBP effectively started in July 1993. The 
SBP Act 1956 was amended by a bill passed in February 1994 making monetary 
policy the sole responsibility of the SBP. The Act was again amended in May 
1997 to further strengthen the autonomy by entrusting the central board to 
determine and enforce the limits on credit by the SBP to the government.
19 
Subsequently, however, SBP autonomy was effectively compromised, first, by 
an ordinance in December 2000 authorising the federal government to direct the 
SBP to set up funds for specific purposes as well as to introduce specialised 
credit schemes and influence the balance sheet of the SBP, and then by 
delegating the authority to appoint the governor to the president. There are at 
least two other problems that effectively limit the autonomy of the SBP. First, 
the SBP governor is appointed for a renewable term of three years, and this 
makes the central bank vulnerable to political pressures.
20  Second, as is clear 
from SBP quarterly reports and Monetary Policy Statements, the unexpected 
borrowing of the government from SBP continues while the degree of 
monetisation of the fiscal deficit remains uncertain.
21 These problems 
notwithstanding, it must be acknowledged that the financial sector reforms of 
the 1990s have provided a modicum of autonomy to the SBP. Therefore, SBP is 
                                                 
19According to Geraats (2005a), such financing limits are important to reduce inflation 
caused by the reliance on seignorage to collect government revenues. 
20Cukierman (1992) argues that central bank independence can not be achieved if the tenure 
is renewable and lasts less than politicians’ time in office. Fry, et al. (2000) report that governors of 
79 percent of central banks covered in the survey had tenures of more than 5 years. 
21According to Geraats (2005a), about 65 percent of the central banks included in the Fry et 
al (2000) survey have effective limits on monetary financing of the fiscal deficit, whereas this ratio 
is only 41 percent when only developing countries are considered. Based on similar considerations, 
Janjua (2004) terms SBP as partially independent.  
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considered as partially transparent in terms of institutional arrangements, 
earning half a score (Figure 1). 
 
4.2.  Economic Transparency 
Economic transparency refers to the release of economic information the 
central bank uses for monetary policy including the current state of the economy 
(data on key variables), policy model that is used for policy analysis and central 
bank’s internal forecasts. 
 
(a)  Economic Data 
The data on money supply and inflation are available on a quarterly basis. 
Though GDP is compiled on an annual basis, as is the unemployment rate, some 
informal analysis in the form of indicators is provided in SBP quarterly reports. 
Capacity utilisation is discussed, on quarterly basis, only for large scale 
manufacturing and not for the whole economy. All in all, SBP is partially 
transparent on data publication and there is still room for improvement. Thus a 
half score is assigned to SBP on this account (Figure 2). 
 
(b)  Macroeconomic Model 
We could not find any information from formal sources on whether or not 
the SBP uses a macroeconomic model. However we obtained informal 
information that SBP now has its own macroeconomic model. The fact remains 
that SBP has never explained how the SBP’s internal forecasts are made and 
how does it conduct policy analysis. So the monetary policy is completely 
opaque on this issue in Pakistan and hence a 0 score is assigned (Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 2.  Economic Transparency in Pakistan 

























(b)  Central Bank Internal Forecasts 
SBP publishes quarterly forecasts both for inflation and output 
normally at quarterly frequency but there are some problems with these 
forecasts.
22  First, these forecasts are available only for the short run (for one 
year) and not for the medium or the long run. The publication of forecasts 
reduces uncertainty in the markets and makes the central bank’s intentions 
more transparent only if the forecasts are at least for the medium term. 
Keeping in view the long lags required before the effect of policy instrument 
on outcomes materialises, these forecasts do not make any sense. Second, 
although the SBP explains rough indicators of forecasts, it does not provide 
information on how the quantitative forecasts are made. So forecast 
mechanism is absent in its reports as are the assumptions or policy 
instrument path these forecasts are conditioned on. 
Third, SBP’s forecasts cannot be called internal forecasts. These are 
simple and rough projections that any organisation can make. Internal forecasts 
help central bank analyse how the policy decisions on the instrument path 
change the inflation and/or output in the long run. From the society’s point of 
view, internal forecasts are important not only because they give some idea 
about the future but also because they serve as an indication of the central 
bank’s intentions. These objectives cannot be achieved if the policy instrument 
path is missing from the process of forecasting. Finally, one of the objectives of 
transparency about forecasts is to raise awareness in the public about the 
seriousness of the central bank in achieving the announced objectives. If 
forecasts based on policy rate path are not close to the stated objectives then it is 
an indication of the deviation of central bank policy from that of announced one. 
In this case, academia and professionals outside the central bank may point out 
this. So the central banks would not like to involve in a policy setting that cannot 
produce forecasted results according to the stated objectives, if the public has 
information on the forecasts.  
The above discussion shows that the forecasts published in SBP reports 
do not serve as indicators of the central bank’s seriousness in achieving the 
objectives and cannot fulfill the objective of transparency in terms of affecting 
private sector’s information. Thus monetary policy is not fully transparent in this 
area if we consider the objective of transparency, though it is transparent if we 
take the short run forecasts without specification of the assumption about policy 
instrument path. So the SBP is awarded half score as it is partially transparent in 
terms of forecasts publication. (Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
22Normally these forecasts are available in the first quarterly report of the fiscal year for 
which the forecasts are published. It means these forecasts are not available even one year in 
advance and are publicly available only after one quarter of the year is passed. But this issue 
notwithstanding, we can take targets for inflation and output growth as more or less projections.  
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4.3.  Procedural Transparency 
Procedural transparency refers to the information on the way the decisions are 
made by the central bank. According to Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), this type of 
transparency involves explicitness on monetary policy strategy and minutes and 
voting records of monetary policy committee’s meetings. 
 
(a) Explicit Strategy 
Regarding explicitness on the monetary policy strategy in Pakistan there 
is not even a single statement about any type of rule in any of the SBP’s 
documents and it seems that monetary policy strategy is characterised by 
discretionary framework. For instance, in 2001 when inflation was well 
contained, SBP took expansionary stance but changed course to tame inflation in 
2005 when it was quite high. Thus there is uncertainty about both the degree as 
well as the timing of the monetary authority’s leaning against the wind. It is not 
clear as to at what level of inflation and/or output gap the SBP will decide to 
react. Also, there is uncertainty about how much the policy instrument would 
change when there is deviation of output and/or inflation from the target. This is 
not surprising as the SBP has never claimed to follow any type of rule.
23  So on 
the basis of this discussion it is concluded that SBP has no explicit monetary 
policy framework justifying a zero score. 
 
(b)  Minutes and the Voting Records 
There is no tradition of releasing the minutes and the voting records of the 
policy committee’s meetings. Only decisions for changing the policy tools are 
announced after the policy meetings and nothing more than that. So the SBP is 
awarded zero score on both these counts. It is worth noting here that Procedural 
Transparency is the only area of monetary policy transparency where the SBP is 
completely opaque. 
 
4.4.  Policy Transparency 
Policy transparency relates to the openness of monetary policy decisions. 
It involves prompt announcement of policy decisions (probably on the day of 
implementation), an explanation of policy decisions and disclosure of policy 
inclination or likely future actions. 
 
(a)  Prompt Announcement 
Policy changes in instruments/tools (open market operations, discount 
(repo) rate etc.) are announced on the day of implementation. But we must be a 
                                                 
23Malik and Ahmed (2007), while estimating the Taylor rule for Pakistan, report that SBP 
had not been following such a rule.  
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bit careful here. The transparency on this issue involves the information on 
changes in the operating targets and not just on the policy tools. It is necessary 
because unless the public knows the operational target it cannot judge whether 
the action taken by the central bank is appropriate or not. The impact of policy 
tools on ultimate targets/objectives is transmitted through the formers’ effects on 
the operational and the intermediate targets. So the SBP is transparent on the 
inputs (policy tools) but not on the (intermediate) output (operational target). It 
is important to note that central banks cannot be said to have private information 
on the changes in policy tools, as other market players also have the same. To 
elaborate, suppose there is an open market operation, a change in the discount 
rate or in the reserve requirements; then commercial banks are involved in this 
process and thus have perfect information on these changes. What the 
commercial banks really do not know is the operational target of the central 
bank, for which these tools are being used. 
Looking at the SBP practice, it is not clear as to what is its operating 
target. Although the announced operational target of SBP is reserve money, it is 
argued in some studies that the bank instead targets short interest rate since the 
financial sector reforms in early 1990s.
24  Besides uncertainty about this issue, 
the SBP does not announce targets for either reserve money or the short interest 
rate. However, the policy decisions on targets for monetary aggregate (M2) are 
announced in the annual credit plan. It is important to note that the SBP does not 
provide information on the short term changes whereas transparency here is 
concerned with policy decisions in every monetary policy committee’s meeting 
and not with the annual targets. Also, the target for M2 is not a target as such, 
rather it is just a projection that depends on the overall projection of the 
economy. This argument is reinforced by the actions of the SBP in achieving the 
target for M2, as this target has been missed frequently in the history. On the 
basis of absence of information on the operational target, SBP has been awarded 
zero score. 
 
(b)  Policy Explanation 
SBP does provide some explanation when there is a policy change. For 
instance, when there was a change in required reserve ratio by the SBP for 
commercial banks, it explained the objectives and the likely effects of the policy 
                                                 
24The following statement, giving explanation of change in the required reserve ratio in July 
2006, indicates that SBP focuses on interbank overnight rate (call money rate): “Keeping in view the 
current composition of bank deposits where almost 87 percent of the deposits are classified as 
demand deposits (as per new definition), the new requirements would result in the substantial 
draining of liquidity from the inter-bank market. The volume of additional cash requirements would 
be around rupees 40 to 45 billion. This would lay upward pressures on the overnight rates and in turn 
on the weighted average lending rates for the private sector”. SBP Monetary Policy Statement, Jul-
Dec 2006, Annex 4 (4.1), page 24. See also Agha (2005).  
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change as well as the rationale for such a change.
25 But it is important to note 
that these explanations are for the changes in the policy tools and not for the 
changes in the operational target of the SBP. Similarly, although the policy 
changes are explained, there is no tradition of explaining decisions in every 
policy committee’s meeting.
26 Another point that needs to be discussed is that 
transparency requires explanation just after the committee’s meeting and not 
after a substantial lag, which is the practice in Pakistan. For instance the 
explanation of policy change (stated above) was published six months after the 
policy decisions. Though still desirable, it is far from achieving the objectives of 
transparency. 
In conclusion, the SBP is partially transparent in this respect and on the 
basis of the above discussion, SBP is awarded half score (shown in Figure 3) as 
it does not explain all decisions after every policy committee’s meeting and 
provides explanation only after a substantial time lag.  
 
       Fig. 3.  Policy Transparency in Pakistan 
























(c) Policy Inclination 
SBP does some forward looking analysis in its quarterly reports as well as 
in six- monthly monetary policy statements (MPS). The information in these 
reports provides some indication about the future stance of the monetary policy. 
However, a somewhat deeper analysis is required to assess whether or not the 
SBP is transparent on this issue. There are three points that need to be discussed 
in this regard. First, the SBP does not publish projection of the future policy 
rate. Second, from most of the SBP reports, the message on future policy actions 
                                                 
25Monetary Policy Statement for July-December 2006. 
26In Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), three central banks are not declared fully transparent on 
policy explanations, as they don’t provide explanations after all policy decisions, although they do so 
in case of policy changes.  
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is not very clear. Occasionally in its reports, the SBP signals policy tightening 
while at the same time indicating possible actions for the output growth and vice 
versa. Third, although the SBP reports do contain some forward looking analysis 
but it is not done after every policy meeting, which is an essential requirement 
of transparency on this issue. On the basis of this analysis we can say that SBP 
does not clearly indicate future policy instrument path and hence is not 
transparent in this respect (zero score) as indicated in Figure 3. 
 
4.5. Operational Transparency 
Operational transparency is concerned with the role of monetary policy in 
achieving targets set by the government. Not all of the variables are in perfect 
control of monetary authority so there are chances of deviations from the targets. 
There are essentially three elements in this type of transparency: deviation from 
operational target (control errors), contribution of monetary policy in achieving 
final objectives, and unanticipated disturbances that may affect the transmission 
mechanism. 
 
(a) Control Errors 
State Bank of Pakistan, in all its reports, regularly announces target for 
monetary aggregate (M2) and also discusses past deviations and reasons for 
these deviations. Even in its quarterly reports, it carries out some forecast 
analysis to assess the likelihood of getting monetary aggregate on target. Though 
the SBP publishes deviations from the targeted monetary growth, it does not 
provide this kind of information on operating targets. However, we think that by 
this practice transparency is not affected because of the following two reasons. 
First, factors that make monetary aggregate deviate from the target are almost 
the same that cause deviation in operational target.
27 Second, the question on 
this issue does not require a time frequency that is greater than one year. So 
although operational target is needed to be announced and explained more 
frequently, the question of why the target was missed can be analysed at annual 
frequency. According to the options given in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 
question 5(a), SBP is transparent, getting full score on giving explanation for 
missing the target as shown in Figure 4. 
 
(b) Transmission Disturbances 
The State Bank of Pakistan provides information on the shocks only 
‘superficially’ without a deeper analysis. In particular, the SBP explains 
                                                 
27Let’s take the case of M2 being the intermediate target and reserve money as operational 
target. Then assuming that money multiplier remains fixed, any factor causing reserve money to 
change will lead to changes in M2. For instance, any changes in NDA or NFA of the SBP transmit 
into M2.  
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deviations from the target (for inflation and output) but not the forecast errors.
28 
However, as targets for one year are just the projections, explaining the 
deviations from the target implicitly provides information on forecast errors. In 
this sense, the SBP explains past forecast errors in its documents, e.g. ‘Monetary 
Policy Statement’ of Jul-Dec 2006, gives some idea of explanation by SBP on 
why inflation target (projection) for the fiscal year 2005 was missed. However, 
as information provided is only indirect, the SBP is awarded half score on this 
issue as shown in Figure 4. 
 
(c) Policy Evaluation 
Although the State Bank of Pakistan does not provide information on the 
exact contribution of monetary policy in achieving the objectives, it conducts some 
superficial analysis of policy evaluation. However one can infer from the analyses in 
the reports that whether or not the policy is successful in achieving stated objectives. 
There are certain statements in SBP reports showing the relationship between 
macroeconomic outcomes and monetary policy stance, though the exact contribution 
of monetary policy in achieving the targets is never mentioned. For instance, in 
Monetary Policy Statements of the last year, the SBP attempted to communicate that 
monetary tightening by the bank had contributed to lower inflation. So we have 
concluded from the statements in SBP reports that monetary policy in Pakistan is 
partially transparent on policy evaluation according to Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 
definition and options in the questionnaire. As Figure 4 shows, SBP has been 
awarded half score on policy evaluation.  
 
Fig. 4. Operational Transparency in Pakistan 
























                                                 
28Forecast errors are real shocks as target miss might be due to the central bank’s own 
actions. But as internal forecasts are based on central bank’s policy setting, they could only become 




In summary, the SBP has been awarded an aggregate score of 4.5 out of 
15. This is lower than any of the central banks’ score in Eijffinger and Geraats 
(2006). The most deficient area is the procedural transparency where SBP has 
scored zero because neither the monetary policy strategy is explicit nor is there a 
tradition of releasing voting records and minutes of the monetary policy 
committee’s meetings. Another area where deficiency is prominent is the policy 
transparency, where the major deficiency is in the announcement and the clarity 
of policy operational target and in indicating future policy actions. In political 
and economic matters there is partial transparency and the major deficiency is in 
publishing medium term forecasts and in making policy model explicit.   
Operational transparency is the only area where there is a moderate level of 
transparency. Here the performance is better mainly because of providing 
information on control errors, though there is also partial transparency on 
transmission disturbances and policy evaluation. It is worth stating that 2 out of 
4.5 (total score on transparency in Pakistan) is contributed by operational 
transparency. Figure 5 shows aggregate score of the SBP. 
 














































































5.  TRANSPARENCY OF SBP IN COMPARISON WITH  
THE OTHER CENTRAL BANKS 
It is instructive to compare the transparency index for State Bank of 
Pakistan with central banks studied in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006).
29 The 
comparison mainly focuses on the practices of only those central banks that 
either got maximum score in an area or their score is very close to that of SBP.  
                                                 
29However one important point to note is that index values for other central banks were 
calculated on the basis of information available till 2002, but in case of Pakistan, our main focus was 
on the reports from 2004 onward.  
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Overall, SBP has scored 4.5 (out of 15) and lies at the bottom in 
comparison with these nine central banks. In Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), the 
maximum score (14 out of 15) is awarded to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
and Riksbank while the Swiss National Bank got only 7.5 score, the lowest in 
their sample. The main deficiency of SBP is in procedural transparency where it 
achieved zero score. Bank of England, Riksbank and Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand are fully transparent in this regard but most of the central banks are less 
transparent on this issue, e.g. Swiss National Bank, Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Bank of Canada and European Central Bank (ECB) got only 1 (out of 3) score 
on procedural transparency. These central banks are less transparent due to 
almost the same reason: opacity in providing minutes and voting records of 
monetary policy committee’s meetings. 
 
Fig.  6.  Transparency Level of Different Central Banks 



































































































Another area where deficiency of the SBP is more prominent is policy 
transparency (0.5 score out of 3). Central banks with full score on policy 
transparency are Federal Reserve, Riksbank and Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
The main reason for SBP being at the bottom is opacity in the announcement of 
operational target. It is interesting to note that none of the central banks in 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) is opaque on this issue. Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Bank of England and Bank of Japan are least transparent in policy matters as 
they scored only 1.5 (out of 3). The reason for their deficiency is opacity on 
policy inclination.  
Most of the central banks in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) got full score 
on political transparency. Interestingly, SBP and Federal Reserve are equally 
transparent (scoring 1 out of 3) in this respect. Not only this, their reason for 
deficiency is also the same: both are opaque on quantification of the targets. 
Bank of Japan that has also low score (1.5 out of 3) has similar reason for 
deficiency. SBP got the same score (1 out of 3) on economic transparency. Only 
two central banks, Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand are fully  
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transparent on this front. On the lower side is the Swiss National Bank with 
score 1.5. Reason for lower score-opacity regarding policy model—is same for 
SBP and Swiss National Bank.  
The only area where SBP has shown significant improvement is operational 
transparency. Interestingly Reserve Bank of New Zealand (the most transparent 
central bank on average) and SBP has the same score, i.e. 2 out of 3 on operational 
transparency.  This is the only area where four of the central banks in Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006) got score less than that of SBP. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, ECB 
and Bank of Canada got the same score as SBP did and the reasons for getting this 
score are common among all these three central banks and the SBP. Federal 
Reserve, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan and Reserve Bank of Australia got 
score less than that of SBP. A summary of all these results is given in Figure 6 
whereas the detailed results are given in Figure B.1 and Table 1 in the appendix. 
It is interesting to compare central banks’ transparency level based on some 
basic statistics calculated in this study with Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). The 
average index value for all the central banks (including SBP) is 10 with a standard 
deviation of 3.
30  All of the central banks lie within two standard deviations from the 
average. As the sample size is too small, a more meaningful comparison is on the 
basis of one standard deviation. According to this criterion only the SBP lies outside 
the limit from the lower side, whereas two central banks, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand and Riksbank, lie outside the limit from the upper side. These results 
suggest that these two banks are the most transparent while the SBP is the least 
transparent. So these three central banks are significantly different (in statistical 
sense) from other banks. Results are given in Figure 7. 
 
Fig. 7.  Transparency Ranking within Two Standard Deviations 













































































                                                 
30These figures are round offs. Exact figures are 10.10 and 3.03 respectively.  
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has assessed the transparency of the State Bank of Pakistan 
using Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index. The SBP is found to be least 
transparent on certain aspects of monetary policy and is far behind the advanced 
central banks. The potential areas where SBP can improve transparency include: 
quantification of the long term targets for primary objectives, making the policy 
model explicit, publication of minutes and voting records of policy committee’s 
meetings, making monetary policy strategy explicit, and prompt announcement 
of policy decisions on operating targets and indication of possible future actions. 
However transparency can be improved in other areas as well.  
Being the central bank of a developing country, the SBP also needs to focus 
on effective communication along with the release of information. As the public 
generally lacks awareness of central bank working and monetary policy, there is a 
need to educate the people on these issues. This will enhance private sector learning 
enabling them to make sound economic decisions, foster public debate on monetary 
policy issues thereby making objectives of the policy in accord with the society’s 
preferences, and help improve the efficiency of the SBP. In line with Nijathaworn 
(2006), we also recommend the adoption of a sequential approach for achieving 
transparency. According to this approach central banks should start with data 
dissemination followed by releasing information on decision making process. Then 
they should focus on publishing economic forecasts and finally on providing 








The precise formulation of the central bank transparency index by 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) is reproduced here. There are a total of fifteen 
questions and all questions carry equal weight, so aggregate score for a 
particular central bank can vary from zero to fifteen.  
 
1.  Political Transparency 
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This 
comprises a formal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritisation in 
case of multiple goals, a quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit 
institutional arrangements. 
(a)  Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, 
with an explicit prioritisation in case of multiple objectives? 
  No formal objective(s) = 0. 
  Multiple objectives without prioritisation = 1/2. 
  One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.  
(b)  Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c)  Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the 
monetary authorities and the government? 
No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0. 
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 
1/2. 
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank 
contract (although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure) 
= 1. 
 
2.  Economic Transparency 
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used 
for monetary policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy 
that the central bank employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its 
decisions, and the internal forecasts (model based or judgmental) that the central 
bank relies on. 
(a)   Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary 
policy publicly available? The focus is on the release of data for the 
                                                 
31This questionnaire is taken from Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). They used it to measure 
transparency for nine central banks.  
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following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, 
unemployment rate and capacity utilisation. 
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0. 
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2. 
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1. 
(b)  Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it 
uses for policy analysis? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic 
forecasts? 
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0. 
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output 
published at less than quarterly frequency = 1/2. 
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output 
for the medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the 
assumptions about the policy instrument (conditional or 
unconditional forecasts) = 1.  
 
3.  Procedural Transparency 
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are 
taken. It involves an explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the 
monetary policy framework, an account of policy deliberations and how the 
policy decision was reached. 
(a)  Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that 
describes its monetary policy framework? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy 
deliberations (or explanations in case of a single central banker) within 
a reasonable amount of time? 
No, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or 
attributed) or explanations (in case of a single central banker), 
including a discussion of backward and forward-looking 
arguments = 1. 
(c)  Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its 
main operating instrument or target was reached? 
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) 
= 0. 
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2. 
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.  
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4.   Policy Transparency 
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions. In 
addition, it includes an explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy 
inclination or indication of likely future policy actions. 
(a)  Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or 
target promptly announced? 
No, or after a significant lag = 0. 
Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation = 1. 
(b)  Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy 
decisions? 
No = 0. 
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1. 
(c)   Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every 
policy meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions 
(at least quarterly)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
 
5.  Operational Transparency 
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central 
bank’s policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving 
operating targets and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the 
transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the evaluation of the 
macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is 
included here as well. 
(a)  Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy 
operating targets (if any) have been achieved? 
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations 
= 1/2. 
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, 
(nearly) perfect control over main operating instrument/target = 1. 
(b)  Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission 
process? 
No, or not very often = 0. 
Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current 
macroeconomic developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2. 
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least 
annually) = 1.  
 
21
(c)  Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy 
outcome in light of its macroeconomic objectives? 
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes, but superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary 
policy in meeting the objectives = 1. 
 
APPENDIX - B 
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1  
Comparison of Central Banks’ Transparency Level* 
No. CB  Transparency Australia  Canada 
Euro 
Zone  Japan 
New 
Zealand  Sweden Switzerland  UK  US  Pakistan** 
1 Political  3  3  3  1.5  3  3  2.5  3  1  1 
a    Formal Objectives  1  1  1  0.5  1  1  0.5  1  0.5  0.5 
b    Quantitative Targets  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0 
c    Institutional Arrangements  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.5  0.5 
2 Economic  2  2.5  2.5  1.5  3  2  1.5  3  2.5  1 
a    Economic Data  0.5  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.5 
b    Policy Models  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0 
c    Central Bank Forecasts  0.5  0.5 0.5  0.5  1  1  0.5 1  0.5  0.5 
3 Procedural  1  1  1  2  3  3  1  3  2  0 
a    Explicit Strategy  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0 
b    Minutes  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  0 
c    Voting Records  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  0 
4 Policy  1.5  2  2  1.5  3  3  2  1.5  3  0.5 
a    Prompt Announcement  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0 
b    Policy Explanation  0.5  1  1  0.5  1  1  1  0.5  1  0.5 
c    Policy Inclination  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0 
5 Operational  1.5  2  2  1.5  2  3  0.5  2.5  1.5  2 
a    Control errors  1  1  1  0.5  1  1  0.5  1  1  1 
b    Transmission Disturbances  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  1  0  1  0  0.5 
c    Evaluation Policy Outcome  0  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  1  0  0.5  0.5  0.5 
  Total 9  10.5  10.5  8  14  14  7.5  13  10  4.5 
  *Values other than for Pakistan are taken from Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). 
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